Dynamic commitment and imperfect policy rules by Joseph G. Haubrich & Joseph A. Ritter
WORKING PAPER SERIES
Dynamic Commitment and Incomplete Policy Rules
Joseph A. Ritter 




FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS
Research Division
411 Locust Street
St. Louis, MO 63102
______________________________________________________________________________________
The views expressed are those of the individual authors and do not necessarily reflect official positions of
the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, the Federal Reserve System, or the Board of Governors.
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Working Papers are preliminary materials circulated to stimulate
discussion and critical comment. References in publications to Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Working
Papers (other than an acknowledgment that the writer has had access to unpublished material) should be
cleared with the author or authors.
Photo courtesy of The Gateway Arch, St. Louis, MO.   www.gatewayarch.comDYNAMIC COMMITMENT AND INCOMPLETE POLICY RULES
June 1998
ABSTRACT
Considering the dynamics of commitment highlights, some neglected features of time
inconsistency problems. We modify thestandard rules-versus-discretion question in three ways: (1)
A government that does not commit today retains the option to do so tomorrow, (2)the government’s
commitment capability is restricted to a class of simple rules, and (3) the government’s ability to
make irrevocable commitments is restricted.
Threeresults stand out. First, the optionto waitmakes theincumbent regime (rules ordiscretion)
relatively more attractive. Second, the option to wait means that increased uncertainlymakes the
incumbent regime more attractive. Third, because the commitment decision takes place in “real
time,” policy choice displays hysteresis.
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When monetary policy is subject to dynamic inconsistencies, optimal policy
requires some precommitmentby the central bank. Despite a proliferation of mech-
anisms designed to address this problem, work in this areahas continued to assume
a once-and-for-all-choice between rules and discretion. This paper asks two closely
related questions: First, what happens if commitment decisions are made in “real
time” so that failure to commit today does not rule out the possibility of com-
mitment tomorrow? Second, if governments can make only commitments that are
difficult, but not impossible, to reverse, what determines the dynamics of commit-
ment and reversal?
The assumption of once-and-for-all choice enforces simplistic dynamics on the
policy process; if the standard models are interpreted literally, for example, the
commitment problem for U.S. monetary policy is moot, having been resolved with
the founding of the Fed in 1914, if not at the Constitutional Convention in 1789.
Much ofthe interest in dynamic inconsistency, however, arises precisely because we
believe that we still can and, perhaps, should commit to a policy rule, be it zero
inflation, a k-percent rule, or a zero tax on capital gains. Once it is admitted that a
government that does not committoday retains the capability to committomorrow,
it immediately brings up both positive and normative questions of timing: When
should a government commit? Why did Canada and New Zealand (for example)
adopt price-level rules?
Furthermore, once the timing of commitment is considered, the next step is to
realize that governments can rarely, if ever, make fully irrevocable commitments,
raising the question of when the government would move from rules back to discre-
tion. Actually implementing a policy rule requires limiting the number of contin-
gencies for the same reasons that private contracts limit the list of contingencies.
A government committed to such an incomplete or “simple” rule may then find its
2rule undesirable in some states and regret its commitment. When is it optimal to
renege on that commitment?
Inthis paper, we analyzethese problems using an approach originally developed
in the literature on investment under uncertainty. Indeed, many ofour results have
natural analogues in the “real options” approach to investment, so that choosing
discretion today has an option value, in that the government may still choose rules
in the future. Careful consideration of this option value provides new insights into
the commitment problem and distinguishes our dynamic approach from the more
static “escape clause” models such as Flood and Isard (1989) and Lohmann (1992).
The remainder ofthis paper develops these themes in two main variations. Sec-
tion 2 briefly reviews the baseline case ofthe standard, simple model of monetary
policy traditional in the time consistency literature. In Section 3 we explore our
first variation, dropping the assumption that commitment is a once-and-for-all de-
cision. We trace the consequences when only simple (incomplete) rules are feasible
and when choosing discretion today does not rule out choosing commitment in the
future. Commitment, however, once made, remains irrevocable. Section 4 removes
the rigid and unrealistic assumption that irrevocable commitment is feasible. It
provides a general way of thinking about policy, allowing costly commitment with
costly reversal. We illustrate how decisions to commit or renege depend on the
commitment and reneging costs and on uncertainty in the environment.
Section 5 concludes by emphasizing three general results. First, in the absence
of commitment, the option to wait, which we have restored to the policymaker’s
decision problem, makes discretion relatively more attractive, suggesting a par-
tial explanation for the customary reluctance of policymakers to commit to simple
rules. The same logic implies that they will be similarly reluctant to abandon ex-
isting rules. Second, the option to wait means that increased uncertainty makes
discretion (or a preexisting rule) even more attractive. This is the “bad news prin-
3ciple” of irreversible investment applied in a policy context, Third, by allowing
the commitment decision to take place in real time, we note that the policy choice
process displays hysteresis; the policy in force at a given time depends on history,
not just the prevailing state.
2. DISCRETION, SIMPLE RULES, AND OPTIMAL RULES
Most of the debate about rules versus discretion has taken place in the arena
ofmonetary economics using simple monetary misperceptions models. We continue
this tradition, and in this section set out the basic model. Though slightly special-
ized to highlight the main points, it derives from a fairly general framework based
on Flood and Isard (1989). Perhaps because of its simplicity, it remains the stan-
dard vehicle for exploring questions about the political economy of discretion and
rules (Cho and Sargent, 1996; Jensen, 1997; Svensson, 1997). Before returning to
the main focus ofthe paper, we use the model to highlight the distinctions between
monetary policy under optimal rules, simple rules, and discretion.
2.1 Basic Specification
The growth of base money determines the inflation rate, itt. Output depends
on unexpected inflation, which causes output to deviate from a natural level:
Yt = ~ + a(lrt — Et_1irt). (1)
Because of distortions (for instance, unemployment insurance or efficiency wages,
depending on your inclination), ~imay not be socially optimal.
Policymakers wish to minimize a social loss function that reflects both output
deviations and inflation:
L(ut) = (itt — E~~1it~ — K± Ut)
2 + air~. (2)
4The first term reflects output variation around the socially optimal level, with K
measuring the average divergence between the natural level ofoutput and the so-
cially optimal level. The innovation Ut, which is i.i.d. with Eu~= 0, is a real
shock. The parameter a measures the weight given to inflation relative to output
deviations.
2.2 Discretion
Discretion minimizes the loss function, L(ut), given Ut, and taking expectations




E~_~ir~ = E~_~ir~ = -~- (4)
As in Barro and Gordon (1983), the distortion term K determines the inflationary
bias of discretion. From this, we can calculateboth the expected and realized social
loss using equation (2).
Realized Loss: LD(Ut) = 1 + a [K ±1 ±aUt] (5)
Expected Loss: Et_1LD(ut) = 1±aK2±1 a~ (6)
The first termof equation (6) is the loss from the inflation bias of discretion, while
the second is the loss caused by output variance, some of which shows up in the
inflation rate via monetary policy,
2.3 Rules
We assume that only simple or incomplete (in the sense of incomplete state
contingency) rules are available. Suppose inflation, ‘itt, cannot respond to Ut, thus
restricting the policymaker to rules that are not state-contingent. Then money only
causes inflation; it cannot reduce output variance. The best such rule sets ir~= 0
5in all periods. This is the optimal rule without state contingency. The simple rule
(itt = 0) produces
Realized Loss: LR(Ut) = (Ut — K)2 (7)
Expected Loss: Et_1LR(ut) = K2 + a~ (8)
Equations (7) and (8) show that the rule has a lower inflation bias than does dis-
cretion, but a higher output variance. If it were feasible, a better rule would let
inflation react to productivity shocks, but also avoid the inflationary bias of pure
discretion.1 (The optimal rule is (3) without the intercept.)
Discretionis better than the simple rule (inthe current period) whenL’~ _LR <
0. Substitution from equations (5) and (7) shows that this is the case when
U~>K2. (9)
Notice that discretion is preferable in extreme times (that is, for large values of Ut),
when the costs ofshocks are especially high.
Similarly, as K increases, discretion is preferred in fewer states. As the distor-
tion worsens, the inflation bias rises and it becomes worthwhile to sacrifice discre-
tion in favor of a rule. The relative return to the rule increases because the higher
distortion increases the inflation bias.
There is an important distinction between (9) and the traditional evaluation
of simple rules relative to discretion (e.g, Alesina, 1988) which compares (6) with
(8). The simple rule is better on average if
2 l±aK2 (10)
1 Of course, by phrasing the issue as rules versus discretion, we are implicitly ignoring
the interesting possibility of incentive contracts for central bankers (Walsh, 1995).
From a normative perspective, such contracts represent a commitment, and are thus
subject (broadly) to the analysis we present here. From a positive point of view, we
observe that regime shifts and policy commitments are at least as common as central
bank salaries that depend explicitly on inflation or unemployment. For an analysis
of the problems with such “high-powered” incentive schemes, see Williamson (1985),
chapter 6.
6This paper is concerned not with whether simple rules are better on average, but
with the optimal time to switch. To that end we later assume (10), but also that
(9) holds for some values of Ut.
3. WAITING TO COMMIT
When possible policy rules are under consideration, the decision to commit
is made in real time: a policymaker must decide whether or not to commit now.
Previous work has framed the question in terms of which is better on average,
omitting the influence of the current state, In this section we analyze the decision
to commit in isolation from the possibility that commitment might be reversed in
the future. This allows us to illustrate clearly much of the intuition that is more
difficult to fix in the more complicated model of the next section.
Adequately capturing irreversibility requires a number of adjustments to the
model. First, it clearly needs more than one period. Second, to better focus on the
problems of regret, it is also helpful to revise the within-period time structure. In
what follows, we let the government observe the shock before the public does and
before it chooses to commit. The new time line, which leaves equations (1) - (8)
intact, is as follows:
Government sees Ut
—* Government decides whether to commit, announces
—÷Economy revises expectations E~_1ir~
—÷Government chooses ‘itt
—÷Economy sees Ut, production.
As is typical in this class ofmodels, the government hasbetter information about Ut
than the public. Some variant ofthis assumption appears in much ofthe literature.
In Cukierman and Meltzer (1986), for instance, the government has information
on a state variable that the public observes one period later. In Canzoneri (1985),
the government observes (perhaps noisily) a random disturbance that the public
7cannot. The additional assumption for our present purposes is that the period
t commitment decision takes place after the government observes the shock, but
before the government chooses the setting of the policy instrument.
In general, this new timing sequence will change the public’s behavior; seeing
what action the government takes provides information about the unseen shock to
the economy. In our specific model, however, the quadratic loss function and the
symmetry of the shocks mean that the public cannot extract useful information
from the government’s decision to commit or not.2 People can infer the size, but
not the sign, of the shock, so that E(Ut government commitment choice) =
Once the government chooses a simple rule, it must stick with that decision
forever, in effect setting ‘ut = 0 permanently. By contrast, choosing discretion
today does not prevent choosing rules tomorrow. Figures 1 and 2 summarize how
the structure ofthe repeated gamebetween the policymaker and the public changes
relative to the standard model.
With a simple rule that is not state-contingent, regret exists in some states;
discretion might be preferred today, though not on average. For example, the gov-
ernment might regret committing to zero inflation and wish for discretion. This
point does not depend merely on the rule’s extreme simplicity, The analysis holds
even with a more sophisticated state-contingent rule, as long as the rule is incom-
plete and there are some states in which discretion is preferred. The possibility
of regret thus means that irreversibility introduces an option value whose worth is
2 The awkwardness of our timing comes from using i.i.d. shocks. Ifshocks were auto-
correlated, a more natural timing convention could be adopted, with commitment for
t + 1 taking place at theend oft, when both thepolicymaker and the public know ~t
and neither knows ‘Ut+l. Consequently, the question ofwhether commitment reveals
information would not arise. However, the additional complication of a model in
which autocorrelation ofinnovations plays a meaningful role (that used by Lockwood
and Philippopoulos (1994) or Svensson (1997), for example) is unnecessary for our
purposes.
~ Jensen (1997), who faces a similar problem, directly assumes that expectations will
not change when the government’s choice is observed.
8nonnegative.
To rule out reputational equilibria, we restrict ourselves to nonrandomized
policies and to those that depend only on today’s shock and whether or not the
government has committed in the past. The government begins this period by
observing Ut. If it chooses to commit to zero inflation (the optimal simple rule), the
loss is
vR(Ut) = LR(Ut) ± J3EVR(Ut+l), (11)
from which we arrive at
vR(Ut) = (Ut — K)2± 1 ~ ~(K2 + a~). (11’)
where V~denotes the present value of losses under rules (the value function for
rules). The first term measures today’s loss, and the second gives the expected
value of the problem tomorrow. Choosing discretion forever yields a loss of
VDF(Ut) = LD(U) + ~3EV~(Ut+i), (12)
or
vDF(Ut)=1(l:Ut_K)±l~~(1±aK2±l:~). (12’)
The standard time consistency literature, making the choice before any shocks are
observed, asks whether rules are better than discretion by comparing the expected
values of (11’) and (12’).
A real-time choice is more complicated because opting for discretion today
leaves the door open for choosing rules tomorrow. The value of discretion today is
VD(Ut) = min{LR(Ut)±/3EV’~(Ut+i),LD(Ut) ± /3EV’~(Ut+l)}, (13)
where the choice shown in (13) is the Fed’s choice between “RjD” (commit) and
“DID” (do not commit) in Figure 2.
9Equations (11) (13) fit quite naturally into the standard dynamic program-
ming formulation of intertemporal choice problems, but it is important to realize
that the structure of our problem differs in an important way from previous work,
such as Lohman (1992). In that work the central banker minimizes the expected
value offuture losses. Equations (11) — (13) add in an additional term, today’s loss.
This reflects the real-time nature ofthe decision problem, and allows the possibility
of regret.
With a few additional assumptions, this simple model generates some insight
into the central issues of regret, option value, and delay. Of course, different pa-
rameters can make either an incomplete rule or discretion the better choice, but of
interest here is what is unique to our model. To this end, we focus on parameter
values for which the standard once and for all choice between a simple rule and
discretion would favor rules—equation (10) is satisfied. We show that even under
this assumption, the possibility of future commitment can make discretion today
preferable. noting the importance of regret in that decision. This increase in the
attractiveness of discretion induces the government to choose discretion in more
states, a policy shift perhaps best interpreted as a delay in commitment.
To rule out the trivial cases, we also need some “regret,” so that simple rules
do not dominate discretion in every state ofthe world. If the loss from rules is less
than the loss from discretion in every state, it makes no sense to delaycommitment
or to choose discretion. To have any regret, it must be that for some (but not all)
values of ‘a, (9) holds.
Let Ut be i.i.d. with a continuous density g(U) that is symmetric around 0.
Because of the symmetry of LD, LR, and g, it is easily shown that the set of
states for which the policymaker chooses to commit is symmetric around zero:
10CR = {~c, u’~].Notice that rewriting the discretion branch in (13) gives
LD(Ut) + I3EVD = LD(Ut) ± /3E[min{V’~(Ut+i),VD(Ut+l)}]
<LD(Ut) ±I3EVR, (14)
The inequality follows from replacing the minimum with its first argument, and
strict inequality from fact that LR(U) — L’~(u)—* oo, as jul —* oo (that is, for
large enough u, discretion is better). It follows from (14) that L’~(u)< j~,D(~)is
necessary to induce commitment when the state isu, otherwise a plan to commit
tomorrow with certainty is superior. Therefore if u0 > 0 is where the loss functions
cross (LD(UO) = L’~(u°)), we have UC < U0 there are states in which discretion
continues even when the today’s loss from discretion exceeds todays loss from rules.
The option of committing in the future makes discretion today more valuable and
so rules are chosen in fewer states.
When CR = [_UC, UC] is chosen optimally, the two branches of (13) cross at
±uc,so
0 = [LD(U) — LR(u)]± 1 W f [LD(~) — LR(~)]g(~)d~i (15)
- ) ~ECR
is satisfied at ±UC, where W = J’~ECRg(~t) dp~ is the probability of commitment.
The first term on the right-hand side of (15) is obviously the current net loss
from using discretion. The second term, then, is the option value of discretion. At
the optimal uC, the option value is increasing in ~@ —impatience reduces the value
ofkeeping the option of future discretion alive, so ôuc/O/3 < 0. A mean-preserving
spread of g that moves probability mass out of CR and into the tails also increases
the value of the option and reduces U”: W decreases and the weight on values of
Ut that favor discretion increases. This is the bad-news principle of irreversible
investment applied to policy choice.
Since UC < u0, the government sometimes chooses discretion in states where
the one-period return favors rules, raising the possibility of a degenerate case with
11CR = 0 (that is, W = 0). This paradox, whereby we delay choosing rules forever
eventhough we prefer pure rules to pure discretion can be ruled out using equation
(13). Suppose the government never commits, so that CR = 0. Then (13) reduces
to EVD = 1 ~ /3ELD.
But from (12), we know that the right-hand side is EVDF, We assumed, however,
that discretion forever is worse than rules, The fact that HC > 0 also implies that
the government eventually commits with probability i.4
3.1 Numerical Example
While our numerical example cannot be called a test, or even a calibration
exercise, we try to use plausible values for the effect of unanticipated money and
the distribution of output shocks. First differences of log GDP look somewhat
like a standard normal. We therefore assume that Ut is drawn from a discrete
distribution that approximates a normal.5 We choose a K value of 1.0, indicating
that long-run output differs from the socially optimal level by 1.0 percent. Following
Barro (1987, p. 469), we assume that a 1 percent rise in money above expectations
increases output by 1 percent. Next, set /3, the discount factor, to 0.95; we think of
the policymaker as choosing between rules and discretion once a year. Finally, we
set a = 2.
Figure 3 shows the results of this example using these parameters. The top
panel plots the difference between yR (u) and VD(u), or between the value of com-
mitting to rules and adopting discretion in a given state, Since we use a loss
function, a positive value means discretion is better, and a negative value means
~ For a very different view of commitment problems using similar stochastic commit-
ment techniques, see Roberds (1987).
~ For details, see Section 4.2, where we describe how to solve a more general model
that encompasses this one.
12rules are better,
Notice that for aushockbetween —1.02 and +1.02, the present value loss from
discretion exceeds that from rules. Consequently, the monetary authority should
committo rules. Forlarger shocks, the monetary authority should choose discretion;
30.1 percent ofthe time, discretion is preferable to rules.
There are really two vantage points on these numbers. One stresses the large
number ofstates where the government prefers discretion. Thebottom panel shows
the importance of considering option value. If we compare using rules forever with
using discretion forever, we would choose rules in every state. The possibility of
future commitment and its associated option value changes discretion from a dom-
inated policy to one preferred in nearly a third of states.
Another perspective is the “delay probability,” or the expected time until a
commitment is made. For example, decisions are taken annually, the probability
that the policymaker will go five years without committing to rules is (0.301)~ ~
0.0025. To illustrate the bad news principle, we increased the variance of the dis-
tribution by ten percent. The commitment region shrinks to the range of —0.957
to ±0.957,SO that rules are adopted only 64.6 percent ofthe time. The probability
ofdelaying for five years rises to 0.0055.
Intuition might suggest that the introduction of serial correlation in Ut would
partly reconcile the two viewpoints because the economy might remain for a long
time in states where discretion is preferred, However, the underlying model here
(a Lucas aggregate supply curve) does not allow monetary policy to provide more
than a short-run offset to persistent deviations from Ut = 0. Inan application where
discretion continues to be beneficial for as long as Ut 18 far from zero, the intuition
is in fact correct (Haubrich and Ritter, 1995).
134. ENTERING AND EXITING COMMITMENT
So far we have allowed only inescapable commitment. McCallum (1995) and
others have emphasized the impossibility of inescapable commitment by sovereign
authority. This calls for a more sophisticated approach to modeling commitment,
but not an abandonment of the insights generated by the time inconsistency liter-
ature.
Although mechanisms allowing governments to commit irrevocably are almost
impossible to imagine, it is not difficult to think of mechanisms that make it costly
for a government to alter its policy. A constitutional amendment, for example, is
difficult to put into place and difficult to repeal. Ordinary legislation has lower costs
at both ends. Governments can, in effect, tie their hands loosely or tightly, but can
always escape, if they have the will to bear the corresponding levels ofpain. In this
section we allow the policymaker to enter and exit commitment, but impose costs
at both ends. We stop short of modelling the policymakers choice of commitment
mechanism, which would take us far afield.
It is important to understand that the possibility of reneging on commitment
does not make “commitment” a vacuous concept. First, in simply mechanicalterms,
the model forces commitment to remain in place for at least one period; it is impos-
sible to “fool” the public by announcing a commitment that will never bite. More
importantly, reneging is costly, both because of the direct cost we impose, and
because the direct cost of committing—should that become desirable once again—
imparts an option value to continuing the rule.6
We maintain the traditional semantics of commitment and discretion, but we
wish to highlight a bias in tone that creeps into the discussion when commitment
6 This does not exclude the possibility that the commitment cost may be some sort
of bond posted for credibility. But the foregoing analysis does say that if another
commitment technology exists that does not require such a costly bond, it benefits
the economy.
14is not irrevocable. This innovation forces us into the use of words like “renege”
and “weasel” with clear negative connotations which we regard as unfortunate.
(The latter term proves notationally convenient, as we have already reserved ‘R’ to
denote rules.) We interpret the results ofthis section as a model ofoptimal behavior
and tolerate the terminology only to fit our paper into the literature on rules and
discretion.
Thinking about the problem as entering or exiting commitment deepens the
analogy to irreversible investment. Our extended model now resembles Dixit’s
(1989) model of firm entry and exit. For these kinds of questions, the continu-
ous time approach generally proves more convenient, but the unanticipated money
model does not easily generalize to continuous time. Fortunately, the discrete time
approach, though less elegant, suffices here. In this we follow Lambson (1992) who
used discrete time to model entry-exit decisions.
4.1 The Model with Commitment and Reneging Costs
We modify the model of Section 3 by adding costs for entering and exiting
commitment.7 A policymaker committing to rules in period t pays a cost C. Once
committed, a policymaker may renege or “weasel out of” rules and return to dis-
cretion by paying cost W. The structure ofthe model is shown in Figure 4. Math-
ematically, the problem is to find the boundaries where the policymaker switches
between discretion and rules. The model produces four boundaries: an upper and
a lower boundary for moving from discretion to rules, and an upper and a lower
boundary for movingfrom rules to discretion. With i.i.d. shocks, the zero mean of
~ Allowing the policymaker to exit commitment adds a component similar to the “es-
cape clause” models of Flood and Isard (1988) and Lohman (1992). In one sense we
generalize those models by allowing a positive cost of recommitment and allowing
delay in recommitment. In another sense, those models are more general in that they
use more general state contingent rules. Such rules can be embedded in ourdynamic
framework. We consider simple rules in order to focus on the dynamics. We discuss
this more fully in section 4.5.
15Ut and the quadratic loss function again conspire to produce boundaries centered on
zero. As before, the current losses from discretion exceed those for the rule when the
shocks are small, while losses from the rule are larger when shocks are large. This
means that the policymaker will tend to prefer discretion when the shock is large
and rules when it is small. The interesting part of the solution is the intermediate
area.
The problems to be solved by the policymaker when discretion and rules, re-
spectively, are in place are:
VD(ut) = mm {LD(Ut) + /3EVD, C+LR(u) + /3EVR}
VR(ut) = mm {LR(U) ± /3EVR, W + LD(ut) + I3EVD}.
The minimum is taken over the actions “don’t commit” and “commit” in the first
case and “don’t renege” or “renege” in the second case.
As in the previous section, let CR be the set of states that induce the pol-
icymaker to commit to the rule. CR is either an interval, [_Uc, ut’], or 0. Let
RR = [—u”~, UW] be the set of states for which policymakers retain the rule (that
is, they renege if jutI > UW). If C is too large, we may have CR = 0; the option
to commit is worthless if its exercise price is too high. Thus positive commitment
cost destroys the result that commitment will happenin finite time with probability
one.
Suppose instead that CR ~ 0. We must have u’W > uC so that CR C RR,
otherwise some states induce commitment that is immediately regretted. Further-
more, we must have UW > > UC. To see this, first suppose that uC > u0. Then
LR(Uc) > L~~)(Uc)A policymaker facing ‘a~ = u~would be made better off by
planning to commit with certainty in t+ 1, thus reducing the current loss (or not
increasing it, if ‘aC = u0) and delaying payment of the commitment cost C. Since
this alternate plan is feasible, UC u0 cannot be optimal. If UW < u0, the pol-
icymaker currently using the rule and now facing Ut = UW would similarly prefer
16delay.
Were there no cost of switching between regimes, the boundaries would co-
incide, with UW = UC = U°. Adding commitment and weasel costs drives a wedge
betweenthe two regimes. Thepolicymaker can only be induced to commit, liquidat-
ing theoption to retain discretion, by a strictly negative difference LR(Uc) — LD (UC).
This means moving uC farther into the area where rules are better, that is, closer
to zero. Similarly, a cost to backing out of rules means shifting UW into the area
where discretion has lower cost, that is, away from zero.
4.2 Numerical Solution
To solve the model with switching costs we use a discrete state space approach.
The shock is drawn from a distribution with n states pj. The probability ofstate i
is
~ i=1
gi = ~ ~(~i) — ~(ii~~~i), 1 <i <n
i=n
where ~ is the normal cumulative density function with mean 0 and variance o~.
We set the range of possible states to include 6o~on each side of 0.
The policymaker is faced with a problem that has two state variables, the
current policy regime (rules or discretion) and Ut. Thus the value function for this
problem is an n x 2 matrix, where the columns correspond to rules and discretion.
Denote the columns by VD and yR. To solve the model we choose an initial value
function and iterate on the following mappings:
= mm {LD(,~~) + /3~gjVD(pj), C +L~~)+ /3~gjvR(~j)}
V~~)= mm {LR(~~~) + ~ W + LD(~~) +
The minimum is taken over the actions “don’t commit” and “commit” in the first
case and “don’t renege” or “renege” in the second case.
17Since the distribution of Ut is discrete, the following rules determine the regime
switching points. The upper commitment boundary uC is the largest ~t such that
V~) + C~
The lower commitment boundary _UC is the smallest ~asuch that
+C~
The upper weasel boundary UW is the smallest ~ such that
+ w ~
The lower weasel boundary —U’”~is the largest ,a such that
V~)+W~ VR(~).
To solve the model in the case of Section 3 (irrevocable commitment at zero cost),
we set C to zero and W to an extremely large number.
Starting from a baseline of: K = 1, a = 2, o’~ = 1, C = W = 1, and /3 = 0.95,
Figures 6 to 8 depict the solutions as we vary parameters one at a time. The
state space has 401 nodes evenly distributed from —6o~to +6o~. Before varying
parameters, however, it is useful to examine the baseline solution in detail.
4.3 Regime Switching
Figure 5 shows one sample path using baseline parameter values. The shading
highlights the periods when the policymaker is using discretion. Figure 5 highlights
a key point: the importance ofhistory. Because the commitment and weaselbound-
aries differ, in some states of the economy (levels of u) current policy depends on
past policy. For anything above UC and below UW, a policymaker committed to rules
sticks with rules and a policymaker using discretion sticks with discretion. Quite
18apparently, then, the current policy differs from past optimal policies at a similar
state of the economy or stage of the business cycle. In a word, our model predicts
hysteresis in monetary policy.
Implicit in the hysteresis is something so obvious as to possibly escape atten-
tion: The policymaker switches from rules to discretion, and from discretion to
rules, over time. Regimes shift. Discretion, commitment, and reneging, will all
occur. This shifting reemphasizes a point stressed by Flood and Garber (1984) in
theirwork on the gold standard: to evaluate a policy rule, the entire dynamic policy
sequence must be analyzed, including those periods where discretion reigns.
Discretion is relatively rare and short-lived in Figure 5 because Ut 1S not au-
tocorrelated, and Prob[jutj UW] is small while Prob[jutI ~ UC] is relatively large.
As mentioned above, there is not much to be gained by adding autocorrelation to
a simple unanticipated money model.
A model with stronger propagation mechanisms would result in longer periods
of discretion, however. If such a model changed the timing convention to put the
commitment/renege choice at the end of the period when Ut 1S known to all (see
footnote 2), the current loss would already be in the past when the regime choice is
made, but Ut would tell the policymaker something about ‘Ut+1, so (13) would look
like
VD(ut) = min{EVR(ut+ljUt), EV’~(ut+ijut)}.
Note that even though the current loss no longer appears, the decision would still
depend on Ut, SO it is still important that the decision is made in real time.
4.4 Parameter Variation
Figure 6 plots the commitment and reneging (weasel) thresholds +UC and +UW
as the commitment cost C changes, keeping W = 1. The probability of being
outside the area where rules are better for the current period does not change as C
19increases. Thus as the cost of committing to rules increases, the range over which
the policymaker is willing to commit shrinks, As we mentioned above, it disappears
altogether if C is high enough.
Not surprisingly, as W increases, the weasel boundaries (±UW) move out, as
Figure 7 demonstrates. It is somewhatmore surprising that the commitment bound-
aries are insensitive to W. This is because eventually crossing ±UW is a low proba-
bility event which therefore has little impact on the decision to commit.8
As shown in Figure 8, increasing the variance of the shocks o~causes the
policymaker to narrow the commitment ranges because it lowers the probability
that later periods’ shocks will fall in the range where the rules loss is less than the
discretion loss and thus increases the value of the waiting option. Two things can
happen (depending on parameter values) when the variance gets large: (1) Rules
may suddenly become inferior to discretion forever, meaning the commitment range
CR collapses to 0, or (2) the commitment range gradually disappears. We show the
latter case in Figure 8. The weasel boundaries tend to be relatively insensitive to
changes in the variance mostly because reneging is a low-probability event.
4.5 Dynamics and Complex Rules
Most observers would take regime shifts in monetary policy as a fact of life,
even without formal econometric evidence ofthe sort provided by Evans and Wach-
tel (1993). Our model interprets these as shifts between rules and discretion,
but another interpretation interprets them as state-contingent rules with “opt-out”
clauses. The two approaches are hard to distinguish at some level, in that a fully
state-contingent ruledepending on the entire past history ofoutcomes can replicate
any dynamic strategy. But we argue in this section that our “commit and renege”
8 The commitment boundaries are completely flat in the figure only because the state
space is not fine enough; the commitment boundaries narrow slightly with a very fine
state space.
20interpretation offers a complementary, and sometimes more natural explanation of
the facts.
For example, Bordo and Kydland (1995), interpret the gold standard as a rule
containing contingencies in cases of wars and financial panics. Even with such
contingencies, they recognize the possibility of regret, because a fully contingent
rule would create “a lack oftransparency and possible uncertainty among the public
regarding the will to obey the original plan.” One advantage of a simple rule like
Bordo and Kydland’s interpretation ofthe goldstandard is that the contingencies—
wars and financial panics—are readily verified. This makes credible commitment
easier. A complicated rule may lose some of the benefits ofcommitment because it
is more costly to verify the government’s compliance.
In our framework, the gold standard can have two slightly different interpre-
tations. Because the gold standard did not bind the hands of governments during
times ofwar, these could be seen as times when the government abandoned the rule
in favor of discretion, returning to rules with the resumption ofconvertibility. Our
own view is that the lack of constraints during war suggests the abandonment of a
standard, and thus to the sort of entry and exit considerations we have analyzed
in this paper. Thus, it seems more natural to explain the Resumption Act of 1875,
which committed the U.S. to return to the gold standard by 1879, as returning to
the rule of the gold standard after the discretion of the Civil War.
Alternatively, the gold standard may be seen as an imperfectly state-contingent
rule that has been abandoned in favor ofdiscretion since the advent of the Bretton
Woods system after the second World War.
A more modern example is the Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act, which in-
structs the central bank to provide for “stability in the general level of prices.”
Section 12, however, gives the Treasury an override provision, a clear case of an
opt-out provision. Still, it would be be straining the meaning of state contingency
21to explain New Zealand’s Act of 1989 or Canada’s adoption of explicit inflation
targets in December of 1993 as provisions of a longextant policy plan, rather than
as commitment in real time.
A slightly different example, emphasizing the hysteresis aspect, is the Volcker
disinflation of1979-1982. It took fairlyhigh inflationlevels—nearly 9 percent during
1978, forexample—to produce the shift to disinflation and monetary targeting, but
the policy did not stop once inflation was brought just below those levels, but
instead continued until price increases had stabilized at much lower level of around
4 percent in 1982. This sort of hysteresis is just the sort predicted by our model,
and the sort not predicted by current escape clause models, which do not include
the option value of waiting.
5. CONCLUSION
Sometimes, the right answer is inherent in asking the right question. The
standard analysis of the choice between rules and discretion, however, has not asked
the right question. The decision regarding rules versus discretion takes place in real
time, not at some mythical starting date. That means the state of the economy
today matters for the choice between rules and discretion. FederalReserve Governor
Martha Seger expressed this point at a Federal Open Market Committee meeting
in February of 1990: “Congressman Neal may still be holding hearings on the need
for zero inflation but 434 other people in Congress in the House and 100 people in
the Senate are going to be dragging us down there to explain why in an election
year they’re facing rising amounts of unemployment back in their districts.” The
real-time aspect of the choice of policy-regime means that opting for discretion
today leaves open the possibility ofadopting rules later on, making discretion often
the better choice. Previous work, by ignoring this option, has ignored an important
advantage ofdiscretion. Rules in place have an analogous advantage over discretion.
22Theoptionto wait, like other options, increases in value asuncertainty increases—
and so the value of discretion (or existing rules) increases as well. Policy, then, has
a “bad news principle” because the ability to avoid regret leads policymakers to
wait, either to commit or to renege. But while the option-value perspective may
explain delay and refusal to adopt simple monetary targets or tax reforms during
recessions or wars, option values do not generally justify permanently abandoning
such rules. Eventually, when the time is right, the government should commit—at
least for a while.
With commitment to rules no longer an irrevocable choice made at the begin-
ning of time, optimal policy looks more dynamic. Periods of rules alternate with
periods of discretion, depending both on the state and history of the economy. Pol-
icy at a given point in the business cycle may look quite different from policy at a
similar point in an earlier cycle. Such seeming confusion may nevertheless reflect a
coherent, optimal, policy choice.
Inprinciple, thenotion ofcommitment as irreversible investmentcan be applied
to other areas, such as tariff agreements, deficit reduction, or tort reform. We
take up a broader range of applications in another paper (Haubrich and Ritter,
1995). This work complements recent studies focusing on the political economy
ofresistance to reforms (Fernandez and Rodrick, 1991), as well as on the delay in
their implementation (Alesina and Drazen, 1991). Our approach emphasizes delay
and resistance as an optimal response to an uncertain future. It also suggests the
possibility of hysteresis as a result of optimal policy choice.
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